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CODE SECTIONS:
BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

EFFECTIVE DATE:

O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-11.1, (new), 51-5-7 (amended)
SB 1
616
1996 Ga. Laws 260
The Act creates a motion to strike and a motion
to dismiss for use by defendants whose right to
free speech or right to petition government for a
redress of grievances related to an issue of
public interest or concern is challenged by the
interposition of a civil suit. The Act requires the
plaintiff and the attorney of record to certify
that the claims are not advanced for the
purpose of restricting such First Amendment
speech. The Act also amends the definition of
privileged communications under Georgia's torts
of libel and slander to include such speech
related to an issue of public interest or concern.
April 1, 1996'

History
A Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suit, is
defined as "threatened and actual litigation"2 by a plaintiff whose
primary purpose is to stop a person or group from exercising the First

1. The Act became effective upon approval by the Governor.
2. GEORGIA CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, STRATEGIC LITIGATION

AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: SENATE BILL 1 PASSED THE GEORGIA SENATE
UNANIOUSLY THIS SESSION. WHY IS IT NECESSARY FOR GEORGIA?, 5 (1995)
[hereinafter GCLPI STUDY] (available in Georgia State University College of Law
Library).
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Amendment rights of free speech and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.3 SLAPP suits and the threath of such suits
prevent people from exercising these First Amendment rights by
"intimidation and delay,... as both warning and punishment to those
who seek to express their views on matters of public concern."4
Although the threat of SLAPP suits widely affects public interest
groups and citizens that oppose such projects as landfills, road or land
developments, and other issues of public concern, actual SLAPP suits
are hard to identify.5 SLAPP suits are typically tort actions that
depend on a claim of damages, real or otherwise, caused by the actions
or words of the accused person or group.6 Typically, SLAPP plaintiffs
claim defamation, interference with business relationships, or abuse of
process. While the types of claims are different, what makes a suit a
"SLAPP suit" is the intent of the plaintiff in filing the action.8 Rather
than seeking redress for injury, the SLAPP plaintiff files suit in an
effort to prevent individual citizens or public interest groups from
speaking out on issues of public concern.9 Situations giving rise to
SLAPP suits usually involve citizens or groups that speak out on
controversial issues in order to achieve an end that has a negative
effect on the plaintiff.0 Common actions that lead to SLAPP suits
include efforts to persuade county governments to deny proposed
landfill sites and zoning or variance permits for unpopular or unsightly
land developments. 1 However, even though the plaintiff may suffer
injury, citizens have a right to speak out on such public issues.'
SLAPP defendants usually win cases actually proceeding to trial.13
However, even when a SLAPP plaintiff loses at trial, he or she may
actually "win" because the goal of the litigation is to delay, restrict, or
reduce future citizen speech, and change the focus of the controversy.14
Existing procedures for redressing defendants' injuries from frivolous
SLAPP suits are ineffective because they are unavailable to the
defendant until commencement of a trial or even after trial is

3. Id.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id
Id- at 1-2.
Id- at 1.
Id.
See id. at 1-3.
See i& at 1.
See id. at 1-2.

11. See id. at 2.

12. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Entertainment Partners Group v. Davis, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979,
983 (1992)).
13. Id at 10. Nationally, 78% of all SLAPP defendants prevail, and 82% of those
going to trial prevail. Id.
14. Id.
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completed.15 The trial-based methods of redress--constitutional
defenses, awards of attorney's fees, sanctions on attorneys, countersuits
and the like1 -- do not solve the problem of SLAPP suits because they
do not address the delay in the defendant's ability to exercise free
speech.17 By the time a case is decided or dismissed, which takes an
average of thirty-six months,18 the public issue at the heart of the
claim may have already been resolved.' The SLAPP plaintiff, whose
goal is to prevent a citizen or group from opposing his or her position,
has already achieved his or her objectives long before trial." Further,
the mere threat of a lawsuit, in which a defendant has no alternative
but to halt the actions that led to the claim and take the issue to trial,
prevents many would-be SLAPP defendants from speaking out once a
single suit is filed." The need to provide an early, inexpensive method
for SLAPP defendants to defeat groundless lawsuits prior to trial led
the Georgia General Assembly to pass the "SLAPP Suit Act."22
SB1
Civil PracticeAct
The Act amends the Civil Practice Act by creating a new Code
The Act is designed to encourage public
section 9-11-11.1.'
participation by Georgia citizens "in matters of public significance ...
[and to encourage] the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and the right to petition government for a redress of
grievances."24 The Act requires plaintiffs who file claims involving free
speech related to public issues to provide additional certifications,'
beyond those typically required under rules of civil procedure, to

15. Id. at 12.
16. Id at 10-11.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Id at 10, 13.
21. Id. at 2-3.
22. Telephone Interview with Sen. Mary Margaret Oliver, Senate District No. 42
(July 22, 1996) [hereinafter Oliver Interview].
23. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (Supp. 1996).
24. Id. § 9-11-11.1(a).
25. Id. § 9-11-11.1(b). The Act requires additional certification by parties asserting
a claim "against a person or entity [that] arises] from an act... which could
reasonably be construed as an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the
right to petition government for a redress of grievances . . . in connection with an
issue of public interest or concern." Id.
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Act requires
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affirmative

the act forming the basis for the claim is not a privileged
communication... and that the claim is not interposed for
any improper purpose such as to suppress a person's or
entity's right of free speech or right to petition government,
or to harass, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.'
The certification must be filed with the pleading and must be signed by
both the plaintiff and his or her attorney of record, if any.'
If a claim requiring certification under the Act is filed without the
additional certification, that claim is automatically stricken unless the
appropriate certification is provided within ten days after the omission
is called to the claimant's attention.' If a plaintiff falsely verifies a
claim, the Act allows the defendant to file a motion to strike or to
dismiss the claim and to ask the court to impose sanctions on the
plaintiff, the attorney, or both. 0 In addition, the court may impose
sanctions on its own initiative.3 Potential sanctions include "dismissal
of the claim and an order to pay the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, including a reasonable attorney's fee. "3
As soon as a motion to dismiss or a motion to strike is filed by a
defendant, the court must stay all discovery and any pending hearings
or motions, unless the plaintiff moves for a specific discovery action or
hearing to continue and shows good cause why it should continue. 3
The Act also requires the court to hear the motion to dismiss or to
strike no more than thirty days after service unless "emergency matters
before the court require a later hearing."'

26. A written verification designed to preclude frivolous lawsuits is required for all
federal claims under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P.
11. The General Assembly adopted Rule l's verification of claims language and
added to it specific details relevant to SLAPP suits. Compare id. with O.C.G.A. § 911-11.1(b) (Supp. 1996). In the absence of a specific statutory verification such as
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, Georgia's Civil Practice Act only requires a plaintiff's attorney
to certify that "he [or she] has read the pleading and that it is not interposed for
delay." 1966 Ga. Laws 609, § 11, at 622 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11 (1993)).
27. O.C.GA § 9-11-11.1(b) (Supp. 1996).
28. Id.
29. I&
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Id. § 9-11-11.1(d).
34. Id.
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The original version of the bill would have allowed the court to delay
a hearing beyond thirty days if the criminal docket of the court made
the delay necessary.35 However, the House Judiciary Committee
disagreed with this exception because of the need for quick resolution of
SLAPP claims." By allowing only emergency matters to delay a
hearing on a motion made pursuant to the Act, the General Assembly
intended to ensure quick resolution of SLAPP suits, indicating the
importance it places on Georgia citizens' right to participate in
governmental decisionmaking." SLAPP plaintiffs frequently file suit
to stop public action "during crucial periods of government decisionmaking, and every day that [citizens] are silenced by a frivolous lawsuit
is cause for concern."'
By requiring an affirmative statement on the part of claimants
indicating that they are not initiating a SLAPP action, the Act allows a
defendant to object to a claimant's improper motives almost from the
start and allows the court to take action when defendants do not
object.39 However, SB 1, as introduced, did not require a written
certification, but rather relied on the defendant to make a motion to
strike or dismiss.' In order to defend the motion, a plaintiff had to
establish that substantial justification for the lawsuit existed and prove
that he or she likely would prevail on the claim.4 The Senate
Judiciary Committee struck the original procedural remedy in its
entirety and instead adopted the additional certification requirements
for the claimant, the procedure ultimately used in the Act.4 The
Committee proposed the change in an effort to prevent SLAPP suits
from being fied in the first place. 3 Because any delay might benefit
the SLAPP plaintiff, the Committee attempted to propose a solution
that would relieve actual and potential SLAPP defendants from
meritless lawsuits with little or no delay." By requiring certification
when the pleading is fied, plaintiffs and attorneys filing SLAPP suits
are immediately subject to sanctions, even if the defendant does not
act.' Under the original proposal, a plaintiff could have filed suit
against a defendant and gained the benefits of delay while the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

SB 1, as introduced, 1995 Ga. Gen. Assem.
Oliver Interview, supra note 22; see SB 1 (HCS), 1996 Ga. Gen. Assem.
Oliver Interview, supra note 22.
GCLPI STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b) (Supp. 1996).
SB 1, as introduced, 1995 Ga. Gen. Assem.
Id.
O.C.GA § 9-11-11.1(b) (Supp. 1996); SB 1 (SCS), 1995 Ga. Gen. Assem.
Oliver Interview, supra note 22.

44. I&
45. Id.
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defendant prepared and argued a motion to strike.' The defendant
would have borne the cost of preparing and arguing the motion and
would have needed to prepare an answer in case the motion was
defeated.' All of these litigation expenses and inconveniences for
SLAPP defendants would have served to prevent many potential
SLAPP defendants from making their views on public issues heard.48
Libel and Slander
The Act also alters Georgia's libel and slander laws by amending
Code section 51-5-7 to explicitly classify "[s]tatements made in good
faith... in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right
to petition government for a redress of grievances"49 as privileged
communications," which may not be advanced as a basis for libel or
slander tort actions.5 In determining whether communication is
privileged, Code section 51-5-7(4) refers back to the SLAPP suit
provisions in Code section 9-11-11.1(c), which define protected speech
"in connection with an issue of public interest or concern."52 As defined
in the Act, such speech includes:
[Alny written or oral statement, writing, or petition made
before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or
any other official proceeding authorized by law, or any
written or oral statement, writing, or petition made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. O.C.G.A § 51-5-7(1), (4) (Supp. 1996).
50. 1996 Ga. Laws 260, § 2, at 262.
51. Id. A claim based upon a privileged communication is only actionable if the
plaintiff can show actual malice. Privileged communications made without malice bar
recovery. Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga. App. 104, 105, 279 S.E.2d 259 (1981). Because
the plaintiff has the burden of proving actual malice, if he or she cannot do so in
pre-trial affidavits, depositions, or other documentary evidence, the court should grant
summary judgment to the defendant. See Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App, 49, 230
S.E.2d 45 (1976).
52. O.C.GA § 9-11-11.1(c) (Supp. 1996).
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legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law.'
Susan D. Hargus

53. Id- The Act narrowed the definition of protected speech as originally proposed.
Compare id. with SB 1, as introduced, 1995 Ga. Gen. Assem. The original version
covered "any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made in a place open to
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest or
concern." SB 1, as introduced, 1995 Ga. Gen. Assem. The House Judiciary Committee
struck this definition, and it was not incorporated in the Act. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1.1(c)
(Supp. 1996); SB 1 (HCS), 1995 Ga. Gen. Assem. By including issues not under
consideration by any government body, the definition of protected speech had the
potential to protect speech that did not further the interest of citizen participation in
governmental affairs, but merely involved private parties. Oliver Interview, supra note
22. Under such a definition, many legitimate plaintiffs with libel or slander claims
could have found themselves without a remedy. Id.

Published by Reading Room, 1996

7

